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Abstract 
 
This study examines the impact of debt financing on the performance of privatized-firms in 
Nigeria. The study uses a panel data obtained from the Nigerian Stock Exchange and Securities 
and Exchange Commission during the period 2002-2009. Our Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
results suggest that corporate financing through debt tends to increase post-privatization 
performance of firms up to a given level, after which any addition to the proportion of debt in the 
capital (assets) of firms reduces their performance. The result also finds that the optimum debt 
financing to capital (assets) of privatized firms are 34.3%, 32.4% and 38.3%. Therefore, the 
study recommends among others the need for the firms to maintain optimum ratio of debt 
financing to capital of the privatized firms in Nigeria. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Privatization policy in Nigeria implies the transfer of government equity shares in public 
enterprises to private ownership. By this process, government stops contributing to the capital, 
and participating in the establishment being privatized. The idea behind privatization policy was 
the inefficiencies of the State owned Enterprises (SOEs) which were set up, prior to Nigeria’s 
political independence, to provide social and economic services to the general public. As CBN 
(2003) noted, these State-owned enterprises became drain pipes for public funds and instruments 
for exerting much pressure on government expenditures and for exacerbating fiscal deficits. This 
reflects a judgment that the economic regulation cum public ownership of enterprises are no 
longer optimal and that some of the activities carried out in the public sector may be effectively 
managed and controlled by the private sector. Like other African countries, Nigeria had to 
introduce an elaborate policy of privatization and commercialization in 1988, as an integral part 
of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which started in 1986. The core objective of the 
programme was to resolve the fiscal imbalance in the light of the inflationary impact of 
excessive budget deficits of which the public enterprises constituted a major cause (Udeaja, 
2000, 2006).  
It is against this background that this study sets to quantitatively assess the impact of debt 
financing on the performance (profitability) of privatized firms listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. It is pertinent to note that a study of this kind is very important and timely because the 
literature on post-privatization performance of firms in Africa and Nigeria in particular is very 
little. In Nigeria, Jerome (2002, 2008); Udeaja 2006; Sanda and Dantama (2008); and Musa and 
Usman (2012) have studied post-privatization performance of firms but none of these studies 
have specifically addressed the impact of debt financing on post-privatization firm performance. 
Therefore, to achieve this objective, the paper has been divided into six sections. Section one 
introduces the subject matter. Section two reviews the theoretical and empirical literature. 
Section three explains the methodology adopted in the study. Section four presents results and 
discusses the findings. Section five makes concluding remarks and policy recommendations 
based on the findings of the study. 
2.0 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
  The theoretical framework for the policy of privatization is rested on the neo-liberal 
theory that emphasizes the incentives and constraints that the market provides to promote 
efficiency within the firm, that is, “technical efficiency”. The theory sees the public sector as 
constituting a big barrier to economic development in recent times. It therefore advocates 
increased reliance on market economy through effective privatization of existing public 
enterprises, deregulation of domestic industries and markets as well as liberalization of trade. 
However, neo-liberal theory seems not to find a solution to most economies, especially in the 
developing countries hence its applicability has been questioned (Craig 2002; Nellis 2005 and 
Jerome 2008).  As Nellis (2005) argued, the separation of ownership from management which is 
a common feature of public limited companies has undermined the efficacy of the privatization 
process in Africa. A typical firm is owned by numerous owners who have no management 
functions and managers who have little or no equity interest in the firm. It becomes so difficult 
for any shareholder (owner) to take a unilateral action to bear the costs of monitoring the 
managers who may pursue interests different from those of shareholders (Ross, 1973; Jensen and 
Meckling (1979) and Fama (1980).  
 Modigliani and Miller (1958) presented their Irrelevant Theorem in a search to ameliorate 
the effect of asymmetric information, agency cost and corporate income tax. This theorem, as 
simply put, emphasizes that the firm performance is determined by the capital structure due to 
the existence of corporate income tax, agency costs, asymmetric information and tax shield on 
debt in a competitive capital market. In other word, leverage tends to increase firm performance 
since debt is risk-free. By implication, the higher the debt equity ratio, the lower the corporate 
tax liability and the higher the after-tax cash flow, the greater the enterprise’s performance. 
Furthermore, Garba (2005) argued that since debt is risk-free, bondholders do not bear the risk. 
The managers must pay back the amount borrowed. In this context, debt financing triggers 
managers to have greater stake in the firm and induces them to take selfless measures to increase 
firm value for the fear of losing their job or the emergency of corporate takeover as a result of 
insolvency. On the other hand, if the internal monitoring system is weak, equity financing tends 
to create a fertile ground for managers to pursue interests that might be detrimental to the 
interests of shareholders since there is no fear of corporate takeover as a result of insolvency. 
Fairchild (2003) added that issuing debt is a sign of high ability of firm managers who are 
capable of repaying it. This is in line with cash flow hypothesis which demonstrates that issuing 
debt invariably sends a positive signal to the investors that the firm is confident enough about its 
future value. More so, large creditors or debt holders can assume the role of active monitors. 
They have large investments in the firms to whom they lend funds and, in common with equity 
owners, debt holders too require adequate returns on their investments. As Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) stated, their influence is on account of three reasons: Firstly, when a firm defaults or 
violates debt covenants, the debt holders receive a variety of control rights. Secondly, owing to 
the fact that certain debt holders typically lend short term, firms have to approach these lenders 
at short intervals for more funds. Thirdly, the need to make cash payments provides the firm 
management with more incentives to operate efficiently to generate even more cash flow (Denis, 
2001). This ultimately leads to a reduction in the agency costs of free cash flow. However, Miller 
(1977) contended that the tax shield advantage of corporate debt is offset by the personal tax rate 
on investor’s debt income which is even higher than that on investor’s equity income. Therefore, 
increasing the level of leverage vis-à-vis equity may not increase firm performance. “If debt is 
too high, it ceases to be risk-free and there will be trade-off between its tax benefits and costs” 
(Garba, 2005). In this case, optimal ratio of debt to capital is therefore required for a firm to 
maximize its performance. 
 Furthermore, after reviewed the works of Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and 
Shivdasani (1995), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) contended that a firm with a high level of debt as 
a proportion of equity induces managers to maximize firm value. Fairchild (2003) found that 
increase in leverage level of the post-privatization performance of British Telecoms tends to 
trigger reduction in the share prices of the company. In contrast, McConnell et al. (2001) using 
two-stage least square estimator found that at ten percent level of significance, debt financing is 
positively related to post-privatization firm performance. This result is slightly different from the 
finding of Garba (2005) who suggested a significant positive relationship between bank value 
and leverage, but after controlling for the squared term of leverage, the results suggested a 
significant negative non-linear relationship between bank value and leverage.  
 Another factor emphasized in the literature on the post-performance of firms is the 
development of capital market. Boulakri et al. (2001) argued that trade and capital market 
liberalization might help attract external funds into the process of privatization. Similarly, Clarke 
et al. (2004) suggested that a market in which there was a high degree of competition would 
perhaps reap the gains of privatization optimally. More so, Demirgue-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2000:10) found that stock market development had a positive relationship with post-
privatization bank performance. However, adding a square term of stock market development 
into the model, Demirgue-Kunt and Huizinga (2000:11) found a significant non-linear negative 
relationship between post-privatization bank performance and stock market development. 
 Furthermore, Demirgue-Kunt and Huizinga (2000:10) using bank level data for a large 
number of developed and developing economies over the period 1990-1997 via Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression model, found a positive relationship between bank profitability and 
inflation. This finding suggests that privatized banks tend to do well in an inflationary 
environment. However, Garba (2005) testing for the Modigliani and Miller Irrelevant Theorem 
on banking sector in Nigeria suggested a statistically significant negative relationship between 
bank value and inflation in almost all the equations in his models. 
 The rate of company income tax is also found to influence firm value. According to 
Damirgue-Kunt and Levine (1995) a significant positive relationship exists between profitability 
and tax rate on bank income. This suggests that banks in a high-tax environment are able to pass 
on part of their taxes to their customers. Conversely, Garba (2005) reported that after controlling 
for company income tax in his model, the results suggested no significant relationship between 
bank value and rate of tax.   
3.0 Research Methodology 
This study uses a panel data obtained from the Nigerian Stock Exchange Fact Book 
(various issues) 2009 and the Annual Reports and Statement of Accounts of firms that underwent 
share-issue privatization between 1989 and 2001. The data is then transformed into logarithmic 
returns to produce valid and non-spurious econometric results since the logarithmic returns of 
initial variables represent the rate of change of the variables used.  To select a firm in the sample, 
it must be listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange with complete data for the period 2002 – 2009.  
Thus, a total number of thirty (30) privatized firms are used for this study. The hypothesis tested 
in this study is stated that capital structure has no significant relationship with post-privatization 
value of firms in Nigeria. 
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple regression is adopted in estimating the 
parameters of the model in this study. This model is expressed as follows: 
FIRMPERM = α0 + α1DBTFINACE + α2INFLA + α3COYINTAX + α4STKMRKDVT 
α5MGTRESTDMY + µ 
where: 
FIRMFERM = The performance of firms is measured in three alternative ways: Return on Sales 
(ROS), measured as net profit divided by total sales; Return on Assets (ROA), measured as net 
profit divided by total assets and Return on Equity (ROE) which is measured by net profit 
divided by the total equity value. 
DBTFINANCE = Debt financing is the proportion of capital of the firm owned through debt and 
it is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets of the firm. 
INLFA =  Inflation is measured as the rate of inflation in the economy. 
COYINTAX =  Company income tax is measured as the rate of tax on firm income.  
STKMKTDVT = The Stock market development is measured as ratio of market capitalization to 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
MGTRESTDMY = Management restructuring is measured via dummy by taking the value of 
one, if the firm has undergone any form of changes in management after 
privatization, and zero otherwise.  
µ =    Error term (assumed to have zero mean and independent cross time period). 
α0, α1, α4, α5, ≥ 0; α2, α3 ≤ 0 
In the empirical literature, Tobin’s Q (the market value of equity plus the market value of 
debt divided by the replacement cost of all assets) has been used extensively as a proxy for 
measuring a firm performance. It is however difficult to get the required information relating to 
the market value of debt issued by Nigerian firms, since these are not usually disclosed in the 
financial reports of the quoted firms. Although, Adenikinju and Ayorinde (2001); Sanda et al 
(2004) and Garba (2005) used modified form of Tobin’s Q which could result to spurious results. 
In order to avoid this problem, this study employs other measures of firm performance.  
To determine the optimal proportion of debt in capital structure, two offsetting facts 
identified in Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Shyan and Clen-Hsun (2009) are considered.  
According to these studies, the tax shield increases the performance of the firm while financial 
distress costs lower the performance of the firm. The Miller model with limited deductibility of 
interest leads to an ∩-shaped graph similar to the one presented in Figure 1.  
 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig1: The Optimum ratio of debt to capital (assets) of the firm 
The ∩-shape in Figure 1 arises from the trade-off between corporate taxes and bankruptcy 
costs. Therefore, to determine the optimal ratio of debt to capital (assets) of a firm, the debt-
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assets ratios will adjust such that the tax advantage and other benefits of debt financing offset the 
expected financial distress costs. In line with Garba (2005), we estimate the optimal ratio of debt 
to capital of the privatized firms in Nigeria by controlling in all the equations, a squared term of 
the debt financing and hence take the second derivative of the measures of firm performance. 
4.0 Results and Discussions 
Table 1: OLS Regression Results 
Independent Variables ROS ROA ROE 
 Parameter estimates and (t-ratios) 
Dbtfinance    0.025(4.23)***   0.042(3.58)*** 0.217(2.98)*** 
 
Infla   -0.936(-1.85)* 
 
 -0.468(-3.05)*** -0.712(-3.14)*** 
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   2.034(3.28)*** 
 
    4.278 
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  -0.376(-3.77)*** 
    
  -0.365(-3.20)*** 
 
   0.324 
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    5.264 
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Source: Regression Outputs 
Significant at 10%(*), 5% (**) and 1%(*** ) 
α
 The critical point is the percentage debt ratio at which the value of each of the measures of firm 
value reaches its maximum in the estimated regressions. 
 
The three alternative measures of firm performance (profitability) are regressed on a set 
of explanatory variables. The result of the OLS indicates that debt financing (leverage) has a 
significant positive relationship with all the alternative measures of post-privatization firm 
performance, implying that firms that go for debt financing after privatization tend to maximize 
profitability thereby increasing their values. This result concurs with the findings of Garba 
(2005) that leverage tends to increase firm performance on the basis that managers would be 
triggered to work hard so as to avoid insolvency that may result to corporate takeover. 
The findings of this study also reveal that a statistically significant negative relationship 
exists between post-privatization firm performance and inflation in all the equations. This 
implies that the performance of privatized firms tends to decrease in a period of inflation.  This 
inverse relationship may be attributed to the premise that investors will prefer to hold their cash 
balances rather than investing at a time of inflation. Thus, the finding agrees with the finding of 
Garba (2005) but contrary to the empirical result of Demirgue-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) which 
suggested that firms tend to increase their performance in an inflationary environment. 
After controlling for company income tax in the models, the result suggests a positive 
relationship between post-privatization firm performance and company income tax. This 
relationship is only significant in the equation of return on assets, thus showing clearly that firms 
after privatization tend to transfer part of the tax burden to customers. This finding is not in 
agreement with the study conducted by Garba (2005) that firm value is negatively related with 
bank income tax but however concurs with the results obtained by Damirgue-Kunt and Levine 
(1995) that a positive relationship exists between income tax and performance of firms. 
Our empirical result further reveals that the development of stock market is positively 
related to post-privatization firm performance in all the equations but statistically insignificant. 
This indicates inefficient and ineffective performance of the capital market in Nigeria. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient estimate of management restructuring has a negative relationship 
with all the measures of firm performance. This implies that management restructuring captured 
in the model through a dummy variable tends to have no impact on the post-privatization 
performance (profitability) of firms.  
As earlier stated in the methodology section, in order to obtain an estimate for optimal 
ratio of debt in the capital structure of privatized firms in Nigeria, we take a squared term of debt 
financing. The result indicates at one percent, a statistically significant negative non-linear 
relationship with post-privatization firm performance in all the equations. This implies that, 
corporate financing through debt tends to increase post-privatization profitability of firms 
thereby improve their performance up to a certain level; then any addition to the proportion of 
debt in the capital of privatized firms will reduce their performance. Taking a squared term of 
debt financing, it is evident that the optimal ratio of debt in capital structure of the privatized 
firms in Nigeria is about 34.3%, 32.4% and 38.3% for Return on Sales, Return on Assets and 
Return on Equity.  
The R squared (R
2
) values of all the equations are relatively low due to suspected 
multicollinearity which might exist among the variables captured in the models. Interestingly, the 
F-Statistic, which is a measure of the overall significance of the estimated regression equations 
are significant, easily passing through one percent significant level in all the equations. This 
suggests that, collectively the coefficients of the variables employed in the model are statistically 
significant at the one percent level. 
5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The main objective of this study was to quantitatively examine the impact of debt 
financing on the performance of quoted firms that were privatized in Nigeria between 1989-
2001. The data used in this study was analyzed by the econometric technique of Ordinary Least 
Squares. The results suggested a significant positive linear relationship between firm 
performance and debt financing. There was also an evidence of a positive linear relationship 
between firm performance and company income tax as well as stock market developments. The 
results further showed that inflation and management restructuring (captured via a dummy) had a 
negative linear relationship with firm performance. After controlling for a squared term of debt 
financing, the result suggested that corporate financing through debt would increase post-
privatization firm performance up to a given level, beyond which an addition of the proportion of 
debt financing to capital (assets) of the firms reduced their performance. Finally, taking a 
squared term of firm financing, it was evident that the optimal debt ratio to capital (assets) of the 
firms that have been privatized in Nigeria was 34.3%, 32.4% and 38.3% for Return on Sales, 
Return on Assets and Return on Equity. Based on the findings of this study, the following policy 
recommendations are made: 
* It is necessary for all privatized firms quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange to 
maintain an optimum ratio of debt financing to capital of the firms so as to enhance 
high rate of post-privatization performance.  
* Since high rate of inflation is inimical to firm performance, the authorities should strive 
to achieve the single digit inflation target which is the target of the monetary policy in 
Nigeria.  
* Since firms after privatization can easily pass the burden of tax onto their customers, 
the tax authorities may consider a moderate companies income tax regime. 
* Given the positive and statistically insignificant impact of the capital market on the 
post-privatization firm performance, it is necessary to support the development of the 
capital market through appropriate fiscal and monetary policies. 
* Restructuring the management of the firm after privatization should be carried out 
objectively so that positions are assigned to competent members of staff. 
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Appendix 1: Nigerian Privatized firms between 1989 – 2001 used as sample  
S/No  Name of the Company    Year privatization 
1. British American Insurance Co. Plc     1989 
2. Crusader Insurance Co. Plc      1989 
3. Guinea Insurance Co. Plc      1989 
4. Niger Insurance Co. Plc      1989 
5. Four Mills of Nigeria Plc      1989 
6. Prestige Assurance Co. Plc      1989 
7. Sun Insurance Co. Plc       1989 
8. Royal Exchange Assurance Co. Plc     1989 
9. West African Providence Insurance Co. Plc    1990 
10. Nigeria Yeast and Alcohol Manufacturing Ind. Plc   1990 
11. Nigeria Sugar Company Ltd.      1990 
12. Law Union & Rock Insurance Co. Plc    1990 
13. NEM insurance Co. Plc      1990 
14. Okomu Oil Pam Co. Plc      1990 
15. National Salt of Nigeria Co. Plc     1991 
16. First Bank of Nig Plc       1992 
17. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc      1993 
18. United Bank for African Plc      1993 
19. International Merchant Bank Plc     2001 
20. NAL Merchant Bank Plc      2001 
21. CONOIL Plc         2001 
22. Unipetrol Nig Plc       2001 
23. West African Portland Cement Coy Plc    2001 
24. Benue Cement Coy Plc      2001 
25. Ashaka Cement Coy Plc      2001 
26. Cement Company of Northern Nig Plc    2001 
28. African Petroleum Plc      2001 
29. FSB International Bank Plc      2001 
30. West African Portland cement Co. Plc     2001 
 
